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Christianity and Society

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WE ARE NOT GOING OUT OF BUSINESS

Ever since it was announced early this year that plans were under way for a new, larger Fellowship, there have been rumors that the Frontier Fellowship was folding up. The news of our death has been highly exaggerated. Actually, the outlook and concerns which have been expressed in this journal over the years will be at the heart of the new organization to be formed in the Fall. We are looking forward to a transfiguration which will bring new vitality and added effectiveness to the work of the Fellowship, which now must widen the scope of its activity and broaden the area of its influence in order to meet the needs of the present situation.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

The MacArthur Episode

It is now apparent that the dramatic dismissal of General MacArthur and the subsequent Senatorial hearings have done much more good than harm in the total international situation. The obvious benefits are: (a) An apprehensive Europe and Asia, which had come to regard MacArthur as a symbol of what they thought to be American irresponsibility, have been reassured. The hearings have made it apparent that the various departments in Washington dealing with defense and foreign affairs have considered all aspects of a complex international situation and have proved themselves as anxious as Europe to avoid a third world war. (b) This reassurance has brought Britain particularly closer to us and has, for the first time, given us a common policy in regard to Formosa. This policy obviates the possibility of turning Formosa over to communist China. Our recognition of political factors in Asia, of which we seemed hitherto to be heedless, has made the British more capable of yielding on military-strategic issues, such as Formosa, about which they have seemed, from our standpoint, to be irresponsible. (c) If the Russians had honest fears that we were intent upon starting a war, the hearings must have reassured them. They have made it abundantly clear that we will not begin a world war, if we can help it. This will not stop the Russian charge that we are warmongers; but it will allay honest fears, if such existed. (d) Our own people will understand with greater clarity what is behind a foreign policy which does not strive simply for victory. MacArthur follows a simple, and somewhat plausible, logic when he insists that the purpose of a conflict is to defeat your foe. But neither a simple military nor a simple moral victory is to be had in Asia. If a military victory were possible it would still not help us to gain a moral position from which we could act creatively in the confused Asiatic situation. (e) The struggle with communism has two dimensions. On the one hand communism is a religio-political movement of world wide proportions which makes a plausible appeal to the desperate peoples of Asia in particular.' On the other hand communism has become a great military force of which Russian power is the center. We can not afford to equate one of these dimensions with the other or to disregard either. The MacArthur episode has clarified the distinction between these two dimensions and has shown why it is not possible to defeat communism merely by containing Russia's military power, nor why on the other hand the possible defeat of communism as a political force in certain parts of the world would necessarily bring us closer to peace with Russia. MacArthur and his cohorts think too exclusively in military terms. It is true that some of the earlier thought in the State department on China may well have made too sharp a distinction between Chinese communism and Russian communism. Yet even though

there is no ideological difference between them, it is still important from our standpoint, as Walter Lippmann emphasizes, to treat every Russian satellite as if it were an independent power in the hope of gradually destroying the unity of the Russian imperium.

A New Fellowship

Recently we called for a larger and more inclusive fellowship of Christians, concerned with the just organization of our society, in these columns. The vague hopes then expressed are in the process of becoming realities. Conversations have been held with various groups who have common ends and interests. The result is that an organizing committee is at work seeking to enlist individual members and groups in a larger fellowship, to be launched in a conference this autumn.

The plans provide for a fellowship which will encompass such regional groups as the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen and the Frontier Fellowship. The former will probably remain an integral group within the larger organization. The Frontier Fellowship, on the other hand, believes that it ought to be absorbed in the larger group. Naturally some sort of eastern regional group must be formed which will in a sense take the place of the present Frontier Fellowship.

Organizationally the problem is to create a fellowship which is at once national in scope and yet effective on a regional or local basis. To accomplish both of these tasks requires that at least 2,000 members be recruited who have a sufficient sense of commitment to a common cause to be willing to sacrifice time and substance for the creation and expansion of an integral movement within the churches. What is the common cause?

We will not presume to give a definitive answer to this question; but the discussions of past weeks make it clear that we are agreed on fairly definite propositions, which might be listed as follows:

(1) We believe that Christians must be concerned not only with the integrity of individuals and with the spiritual quality of individual lives but with the structure of the human community on every level, from the local through the national and international community. We do not believe that individual goodness automatically solves any issue of social justice. The moral quality of a community is partly determined by the integrity and the moral concern of the individuals who comprise it; but it is also determined by the actual structures and systems through which its economic, social and political life is ordered. It is particularly important to emphasize this point today because of the recrudescence of a dangerous compound of Christian pietism and political and economic reaction. The thesis of this type of Christian thought is that Christian generosity or economic self-seeking within the bounds of honesty makes all concern for social structures superfluous and even dangerous. Thus the unhindered and unchecked display of economic power and search for economic gain is given an uncritical religious sanction.

(2) We believe that the remnants of sympathy for the communist cause on the Christian left must be destroyed. A necessarily critical attitude on the part of prophetic Christianity toward the pretensions of our own nation or cause must not lead to the absurd conclusion that the historic alternative to our cause is morally preferable. The belief that the imperfections of justice in a capitalist society prove the acceptability of at least some aspects of a communist society, has corrupted the conscience of portions of both the secular and the Christian left. The tragedy of our age lies in the fact that the orthodox Marxist alternative to capitalism has created disproportions of social power, corruptions of justice through power, and monstrous cruelties of such vast proportions that even an oblique sympathy for the communist cause must lead to moral confusion.

(3) The rejection of every aspect of communist theory and practice must also prompt socially-minded Christians to a con

stant reexamination of the validity of the socialist convictions which inform the non-communist left in the western world. It is fairly obvious that dogmatic presuppositions of American "free enterprise" liberalism are a source of grave errors. It is equally obvious that the non-communist socialism of western Europe still carries too much Marxist baggage to be the most effective political force in the establishment of a just and democratic society. A truly democratic political and economic program must be a pragmatic one in the sense that it has no absolute answers to the problem of achieving justice within a framework of freedom. It knows that the collectivization of property and the centralization of power develops almost automatically in any technical society. Against these automatic tendencies the concious will of a community must strive to distribute power, to hold it morally accountable, and to make it socially responsible. Socialization of property can neither be excluded as one possible instrument for this purpose, nor be exalted as the one panacea for every social ill. Likewise the operations of a free market and of the automatic balances of justice in a free economy must neither be rejected as valueless nor regarded as adequate for every problem of justice.

(4) We believe that there are resources in the Christian faith which have not been fully appropriated for the solution of the problems of man's community. The Christian understanding of the power of both love and self-love throws light upon the issues of justice in the human community. It helps men to understand how necessary and yet how tentative and relative are all the particular structures of justice which are established from time to time in various communities. The illusions which are derived from an undue reliance upon the disinterestedness of human reason or the progressive perfectability of man are overcome. In every situation it is understood that a structure of justice must be both an instrument of the law of love (that is, a method for the fulfillment of our responsibilities to our neighbor), and also a dyke against the destructiveness of pure self-interest. Thus ideally a Christian social policy can be thoroughly pragmatic in detailed measures of justice without yielding at any point to the cynicism which exalts power or which regards self-interest as harmless. It must be the purpose of an effective Christian group which deals with social politics to explore continually the relevance of the Christian understanding of man, God and history to the practical issues of man's social life.

(5) We believe that a Christian group of this kind must be bound together in a religious bond as well in terms of common political convictions. We therefore hope to cultivate a common life of prayer in our local, regional and national conferences. Ultimately the concern for the worship which must underlie our social action should be productive of new ventures in liturgical norms, adequate for the expression of our relation to the community in terms of gratitude for its benefits to us, contrition for the evils institutionalized in it, and dedication of our resources for its improvement.

(6) We believe that the new Fellowship must seek to reach the minds of a larger number of ordinary laymen within the churches. To this end it will seek to publish much more pamphlet literature than has been attempted in the past. This journal will however remain as an organ of the larger group, according to present plans.

Christian Idealism

In a recent conference a prominent economist sought to relate Christian thought to economic realities; he found it very difficult to do so because he was certain that any viable economic system would have to come to terms with man's self-interest while Christianity, in his opinion, insisted that men were, or ought to be, "altruistic." He was not quite clear whether Christianity merely insisted that men ought to be altruistic or whether it asserted that they were. In the latter case there could be no real relevance between Christianity and econom-

ics. In the former case the economist could always put off a Christian by expressing the hope that men would some day be altruistic and insisting meanwhile that we must have an economic system which harnesses, deflects, and beguiles their self-interest.

The difficulties in which our economist friend found himself reveal to what degree even very enlightened academic circles may completely misunderstand the Christian faith. Either they have a picture of it which comes from a fundamentalist youth, or, what may be even more confusing, they identify it with a naive idealism which refuses to come to terms with any of the obvious realities of life. Thus while one side of our culture accuses Christian thought of having too pessimistic views of human nature and of overstressing the fact of sin in human life, another side assumes that Christianity is devoted to an incredible trust in the "altruistic" possibilities of human nature. Sometimes these misunderstandings are, of course, due to Christians themselves. If, for instance, a hard-headed social scientist should come upon Pitrim Sorokin's volume *Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behaviour,* a publication sponsored by the "Harvard Research Center in Altruistic Integration and Creativity," and if he should erroneously regard Sorokin's thought as typical of Christian doctrine, he might well dismiss the Christian faith as irrelevant to any serious consideraton of the social issues of our day.

Actually every more profound form of Christian thought has taken the problem of self-interest rather more seriously than most forms of modern secularism. It has done so because it knows that what Winstanley called "particular love" in distinction to "universal love" is not merely a vestigial remnant of a tribal past nor yet merely the inertia of man's biological survival impulse, operating against the inclusive purposes of his mind. It knows that man seeks his own endlessly even as he also endlessly seeks to subordinate himself to some pattern of life greater than his own. Political justice is most certainly achieved when we consciously build structures of social harmony which are intended not merely to check the selfishness and greed of other people, regarded as more selfish than we are; but when we recognize that a proper structure of justice embodies the highest possibilities of disinterestedness of every man, which must operate against the immediate inclinations of self-interest evident in the very same man.

We Need an Edmund Burke

American political thought is not always mature. But in some respects our pragmatic-historical approach to the issues of social justice has points of similarity with the position of Edmund Burke, when he challenged the rationalism of the French revolution with the history-informed wisdom which has always been the boast of English political thought. We have, of course, no one who could do what Burke did in his day. But we can hint nevertheless that America, for all of its weaknesses, embodies some of the wisdom which Burke articulated; and that some political thought of the British left exhibits striking similarities with the rationalism of the French revolution. Marxist rationalism and liberal-bourgeois rationalism are, after all, brothers under the skin.

Not that the British Labor Party is basically rationalistic or orthodox Marxist. Its superior political and moral strength over the socialism of the continent derives precisely from its heritage of Christian radicalism rather than Marxist rationalism. But British socialism does have a purer Marxist left. Let us take Aneuran Bevan as a typical spokesman of this position. Bevan quit the government for two reasons. The first was his belief that medical services should continue to be absolutely free, whereas the new budget provided for graduated payments for medicines and, particularly, for dentures. The second reason was his belief that the rearmament policy of the government was prompted by an undue subservience to American authority, and Bevan and his colleagues detest America as a capitalistic power. Both reasons for leaving the

Labor government are related to Bevan's too abstract Marxist concepts.

Bevan's protest against the new budget revolved around the question of dentures or false teeth. He wanted them to be as free as every other aid to human health while the Chancellor of the Exchequer insisted on exacting moderate charges. To assume that demands upon a scheme of socialized medicine can be met without any checks against inordinate demands is to assume, with Marxism, that human needs are determinate and human desires are ordinate. Actually human desires are inordinate from some standpoint or other because needs are indeterminate. Bevan explained the constantly mounting costs of socialized medicine with the theory that the unanticipated demands upon the medical services were due to a backlog of unfilled needs. This was of course partly true because many people had been too poor to buy either spectacles or false teeth. But it was not wholly true. The case of the dentures proves his error.

Let us assume that a dentist is dealing with a patient who has four good teeth in his upper jaw. The possibilities are either to pull the remaining teeth and give the patient a "plate" or to leave the teeth and give the patient a costly "bridge." The bridge is probably four times as expensive as the plate. If the service is completely free how can the dentist arrive at a just decision? Ultimately all patients must accept either the cheapest possible answer to the problem of their teeth or they must all be given the most expensive solution. Actually there must be enough flexibility in a system of socialized medicine to give the patients some choice. If they want the best possible equipment of false teeth or wooden legs, they ought to be asked to make some contribution to that end. Otherwise people who would prefer to have a new piano rather than the most ideal denture will be robbed of the chance of making such a choice. For the taxation system, which must bear the burden of ideal solutions in the realm of health, will be so high as to rob them of a chance to buy a piano.

All this is no argument against socialized medicine. There must be basic security in matters of health; and we may expect our American policy to move as certainly toward that end as the British policy has done. But socialized medicine was unnecessarily put in false repute by unrealistic concepts about human nature, particularly by the inability of Marxism to comprehend the boundless character of all human needs and desires, including the desires which pertain to health. Meanwhile experience has already caused Britain to modify its health scheme in the interest of a greater realism. A part of this realism pertains to the problem of the boundless character of human needs; a part pertains to the recognition that the burden of any basic social service must be borne by all the people and not merely by a few wealthy individuals.

Bevan's second reason for leaving the government was his conviction that British rearmament was an unnecessary concession to American power. Actually the rearmament was a necessity dictated by a tragic world situation. In this world situation the USA now bears the kind of responsibility and must exercise the kind of initiative which Britain once exercised. In the days of British hegemony it was the fashion of American liberalism to justify an irresponsible isolationism by criticisms of British "imperialism." According to our bourgeois-liberal notions America was not an imperialistic power. According to the British left America is now the imperialistic power *par excellence.* The reason the British left is so certain about this is because it has some pretty uncritical notions about the relations of capitalism to imperialism. This persuades some British socialists, as for instance G. D. H. Cole and *The New Statesman and Nation,* that Russian power is still in some sense preferable to American power.

These judgments are at least partly informed by the orthodox Marxist notion

that capitalist nations are imperialist and non-capitalist nations are non-imperialist *by definition.* Actually our American power is very disproportionate in the present world community. We may take it for granted that in a situation of great disproportion of power there will be some injustice. It would be better for us and for the world if our power were not so great. Undoubtedly some injustices will be occasioned by the fact that there is not sufficient check upon our power. Mr. Bevan may be right, for instance, in his charge that our stock-piling of materials, required for war, has led to unnecessary inflationary tendencies in the European economy. But he is wrong in assuming that we are particularly greedy because we are a capitalist power. Capitalism in its unmodified form undoubtedly expresses itself in ventures of power, prompted by the desire for gain. But our present policies are primarily prompted by considerations of security rather than gain. Our motives are just as mixed as are British motives in the British attitude toward the problem of Iranian oil; but not more so.

Relations between nations, as between individuals, are improved if presuppositions about human conduct which force us to regard our friend, competitor or foe as corrupted by some special measure of evil are dispelled. The criticisms of Britain by American conservatives and of America by the British left are on the whole prompted by ideological prejudices. They will be improved if we dispel the dogmatic presuppositions of both right and left. If this should be achieved it may be the good fortune of America to re-import into Britain some of the history-minded pragmatism of which Burke was once the classical spokesman.

Distribution of Income in the USA

That America is not a wilderness of rampant individualism and anarchic injustice, as frequently pictured in the European press, is revealed by the progress toward justice made from 1929 to 1946 in the distribution of income. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research the highest paid 5% of our population received 34% of the national income in 1929 but only 18% in 1946. The highest paid 1% was reduced from 19% to 7.7% of the national income in the same period. The per capita income of this highest group dropped from $13,000 to $9,000 during these seventeen years. Meanwhile the per capita income of the whole working population rose from $690 to $1,666.00 after taxes. During this period the national income doubled while the population increased by 25%. Higher productivity obviously accounts for the higher average income of the total population. But social policy, roughly associated with the "New Deal," is certainly responsible for the greater equity in distribution of income.

Surely this is a very considerable revolution. It may be more drastic in its consequences than some more advertised revolutions of Europe.

THE SALVATION OF HISTORY

By CLIFFORD L. STANLEY

I.

The special crisis of history is the fact that while all men have history, the majority of men lack any sense that history as a whole is meaningful.

The fact that all men have history is expressed with singular exactness by the phrase "nature and history." In nature, things are under the power of structure, of constitution. In history, events are connected with freedom. History is the concrete embodiment of freedom. Everything human is dependent on the historical character of human life. This is true of all cultural productions. It is true of such things as individuality and family life. Even denials of the meaning of history can be made only by historical men and are thus dependent upon history. It is true that some men seem to be "pre-historical," but many of these are retrogressions or marginal participants in historical traditions. If we found men who were truly pre-historical, we should have to call them potential men and not men as such. Man is not a species of nature, however exalted. Man makes himself, and that self-making is history.

While the conviction that history as a whole is meaningful is seldom found, every historical group feels that its life is of ultimate meaningfulness and importance. This conviction is unreflective and indeed is part of what we mean by "history." In Japan the ruler is the "heavenly grandchild," in China the "son of heaven," in Egypt the "son of God," in Peru the "son of the Sun." It is so everywhere. In the sacred ruler the people sees the symbol of its own holy existence. The life of the historical people is always an incarnation, and always out of some "Egypt" does God call his "son." The connection of forum and altar is invariable, intimate, and in its meaning unmistakable.

While every historical group considers its life as absolutely significant, it is able to see this truth only in its own case. In Greece, the word "man" meant Hellenic man. The word "barbaros," from which our word barbarian is derived, is eloquent of this. Just as the Greek assumed that others did not speak intelligibly, the Slav thought that others did not *think* intelligibly. The word Slav means "we understand." The clear implication is that others do not understand. The life of these others who are not quite human is either meaningless, or, more likely, an actual disvalue. The gods of the Dravidians of India were demons to the invading Aryans. Athene and Hera fought with the Hellenic confederation against Troy. The Nazis were in their racial doctrines but re-echoing an ancient theme. It sounded new, not because it was new but because it had become unfamiliar.

While every people has history, in only a few instances has a people reached the conviction that history as a whole is meaningful. Take the Greeks as an example. Windelband says: "The inquiry for a meaning in *human history taken as a whole,* for a connected plan of historical development, had never once been put forward." (*History of Philosophy,* New York, 1893, p. 255. Italics his.) Aristotle is interesting at this point. He put forth the idea of "kairos" or "good in the category of time," but he envisioned no kairos for time as a whole. He used the word "history" as a part of the title of a book about biology. This title might be paraphrased, "Researches about living things." The fact that Aristotle could use the word "history" to mean, at the most, an account or story, is significant, as is also his application of the word to biology. Aristotle wrote a description of the polities of 158 states, but the motive was not unlike that of his classifications in

biology. To conclude, while the Greeks had a richly elaborated philosophy, they had no title "philosophy of history," so beloved of modern man.

The one apparent exception is that of the Stoics. The Stoics had an account of the course of human events as a whole, which by courtesy we can call a philosophy of history, though they did not so call it. For the Stoics, who held a strict Democritean materialism, every event was strictly determined. This determination was believed by them to be rational and from that angle was called Providence. Not only were all events determined, but they also were repeated infinitely. Everything came out of fire and after a prearranged course was engulfed in fire, from which all things come again as before. But such strict causality and cyclic repetition is the mark of the physical, as studied in classical physics. Thus we may conclude that the one Greek philosophy of history is a subhistorical philosophy, because it understands history in the light of what is below history.

The Greeks never attained a properly historical interpretation of history. With the exception of Israel, the Greek failure stands for a common human failure in this field. This failure shows that history as a type of being is not necessarily and simply meaningful. If history is considered to be meaningful, this conviction is due to factors beyond simple participation in historical life and beyond mere observation of the human panorama.

The failure of the majority of mankind to find a meaning for "human history taken as a whole" (Windelband) is itself significant, but for the moment we are concerned with its embarrassing consequences. On the one hand the basis of the life of thought, as of all life, is historical thought. Yet most men, building on this basis, have developed un-historical or even anti-historical thought. This suggests that its own basis witnesses against it. Every particular meaning is connected with a particular historical situation and meaning as such is dependent upon the historical life of free men. It is astonishing therefore that man in general does not see in history as such the most luminous and meaningful thing of all. At all events there is disaccord between historical life and man's interpretation of history, or lack of it. In such a case the truth seems to lie with the historical facts and not with the unhistorical thought which makes light of the facts.

If history stares the unhistorical thought out of countenance, the unhistorical thought embarrasses historical life severely. Thought is not simply an instrument. It has to do with the truth. But thought is always inevitably instrumental. In the present instance, unhistorical thought robs man of needed guidance and anti-historical thought actually wounds historical living. If man does not know how much to expect of historical life he will suffer from deficiency of hope and effort. If he expects too much or expects in the wrong quarter he will be reproved by the truth. But each of these dangers is alone avoided by a properly historical type of thought about history.

There is a special form of this general crisis involving history, a form which confronts modern western man. In the case of modern man the problem is not to win an interpretation of history but to retain one already in possession.

Modern man has a very considerable degree of thought about history as such, about "human history taken as a whole." So marked is his concern with history that in any portrait of modern man this preoccupation must be regarded as a major feature. It is only in modern philosophy that "philosophy of history" appears as a title. Modern men differ endlessly about the details, but they are at one in holding that historical life as a type of being is essentially meaningful. They consider that all men, in all times and places, are embraced in a common human destiny. This is true of evolution, progress doctrine, marxism.

Modern man has cast off the Christian form of his life and intends to live in the manner of secular humanism. But this has dangerous consequences for his historic type of thought, as for other matters. It was from the Hebrew-Christian tradition, by way of the Apologists, Augustine, and Joachim of Floris, that modern man derived his sense for the meaning of history. Consequently modern man has kept the gift but repudiated the giver. This makes for divergences in the manner of dealing with the gift. Modern man believes that the meaning of history is immanent in history and that time of itself brings forth. If the Hebrew-Christian tradition had not gone beyond that it would not have considered history meaningful, nor would modern man have a chance to endanger an inherited meaning. Modern man thinks that all men are automatically in one historical destiny. The Hebrew-Christian tradition believed this to be true apart from evidence and indeed against the evidence. The reason for universal history was primarily to be sought in God, and in man only as viewed under God. Modern man, by ignoring God, jeopardizes the universal history which appeared only where His name was acknowledged. The atomizing tendency of the Nazis may be regarded as the first major threat to universal history when its true content is lost.

The problem of history is that men shall find historical life meaningful, not only in the particular historical group, but for all men and for the whole course of historical time. The special modern form of this problem is that this view, already possessed, shall not be lost.

II.

The Christian answer to the problem of history is the Kingdom of God.

Before this expression is usable a bit of re-thinking is necessary. For many centuries this great term—the Kingdom of God —was to all intents and purposes a lost word. This was true to the extent that the eschatological mood of the early church waned, and to the degree that Greek thought overlaid the original Hebraic pattern.

The manner in which the term was recovered had a strong effect upon its modern employment. Kant used a term, "the realm of ends," to describe the proper concern of his "good will." Schleiermacher took this up and connected with it the ancient term Kingdom of God. Ritschl praised Schleiermacher for recovering the ancient term but criticized his unsystematic use of it. It was Ritschl who popularized the term and made it a part of our vocabulary. It is interesting to speculate on how much the development of biblical criticism of the Gospels was dependent on this somewhat unbiblical development.

As C. H. Dodd says in *The Parables of the Kingdom* (New York, 1936, p. 34), the expression "Kingdom of God" is ambiguous in both English and Greek. That is, we may emphasize *the Kingdom,* which is God's, or we may emphasize *the God* whose kingdom it is. Due to the manner in which the term became current in modern thought the former aspect was emphasized. The emphasis was on the Kingdom which is God's. The Kingdom was a social order. It was an order in which certain timeless principles were acknowledged and realized. Usually it was remembered that it was the Kingdom of *God.* But in this secular age that was a cause for restiveness and some embarrassment. The Matthean "kingdom of heaven" was vaguely preferred, due to ignorance that "heaven" was an indirect way of speaking of God. But the abbreviated term "the kingdom" was liked best of all, for religious people could mentally add "of God" and others could mentally omit the divine name.

While the expression "Kingdom of God" is ambiguous in Greek and English, it is not ambiguous in the Aramaic or Hebrew. The Aramaic word is "malkuth," a parallel of the Hebrew "malekuth." The latter is a noun formed from the verb "malak," to reign. With this latter is connected the word "melek," king. The well-known

moloch was a deliberate distortion of the word melek, as if we should say "der kink" or "hi, kingy!" The word we translate "kingdom" is thus a verbal noun and it has the force of an adjective or a modifying clause: the ruling God or the God who rules. First and foremost it is a word about God. To omit God or to subordinate Him where the expression "Kingdom of God" is concerned, is to play "Hamlet" with the part of Hamlet deleted. Second, the expression "Kingdom of God" presents God under the aspect of rule or kingship. Other words present Him as creating or forgiving or teaching. Finally, this is a very dynamic expression, unveiling God in the act of ruling, which action is the ultimate factor.

At this point we must perform an act compounded in equal parts of courage and foolhardiness. We must employ the idea of the Kingdom of God. This is foolhardy because no conceivable modern use could escape trampling on the toes of at least one set of New Testament scholars. It is courageous because if we waited for the scholars unanimously to give us the go-ahead, we would never employ the idea at all.

For us, then, the Kingdom of God is the omnipotence of God in relation to the life of freedom. It is God's ruling over the volitional, dynamic life of man, or history. This means that we know no God apart from the detail of historical life. Were history a tissue of inanities or a scene of unrelieved ruin, God, presumably, would not bother to rule over it. Furthermore, we know no history apart from God's rule over it. To regard history as self-explanatory, apart from the constant dynamic action of God, is to lose the way, and anything may be expected. God is always in history as God, that is, omnipotently. At every point He rules and no point is without that rule.

While the rule of God is itself invariable, it manifests itself in varying ways. On the one hand, Christ has come. The future which was anticipated is now the present. The rule of God is not only objective in events but is now subjective in men in a new way. In this sense it has become more manifest. On the other hand, Christ is to come again. There is to be the resurrection, the judgment, the fullness of the kingdom. These things mean that while the reign of God is established in a new manner in the Christian era, that very achievement brings new complexities and enigmas. Our present situation is between the first and the second comings. It is sometimes referred to as the Kingdom of Christ. Barth calls it the *regnum gratiae* in contradistinction to the *regnum gloriae*. Like other men we live in "this age;" unlike them we live in it by the power of "the age to come."

The paradoxical character of God's rule in the Christian era is expressed in two historical ideas, one more negative, the other more positive. The negative method of expressing God's present rule is justification. In a descriptive sense events are what we know them to be, sinful or demonic, that is, good and evil. In either case history is self-defeating in the end. But God touches them and their ultimate meaning is transformed. By the power of the atonement these historical events among which we live are transformed and they mean salvation. This is justification—history is self-defeating in fact, while to our faith it is the sign of victory.

The more positive way is expressed by Paul as the gift of the Spirit. But while we have the Spirit we look for the "redemption of the body" (Romans 8:23). The mixed situation of our present life is expressed in the words, "The body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness" (Romans 8:10). The "spirit" and the "body" are not two ingredients of man, as if we had here a kind of anti-corporealism. The spirit is the true Godward (God as revealed in Christ) orientation of the Christian man. The body is the whole concrete man—mental and physical, conscious and subconscious, individual and social, secular and religious—in a word, every concrete historical manifestation.

When a man believes that he is justified, new empirical historical possibilities become open to him. Justification thus becomes an Archimedian point, above and beyond the world, on whose basis a man may act. The forgiven is able to forgive, yes, must do so. Gratitude generates energy. The new meaning of all things provides a clue to new kinds of action and encourages them. The same miraculous new possibility comes from the indwelling Spirit. Love, which in the biblical sense (agape) is not a human possibility, is made possible. The new unity of men in the Spirit gives rise to empirical possibilities that cannot develop elsewhere. Doubtless these new virtues bring corruptions and occasions of failure known only to Christians. But the very corruptions and failures presuppose the virtues.

In sketching the above we have reached the limits of human history. It is a mixed situation; only "beyond history" is the simple situation we often sigh for. It is true that justification and the Spirit bring unprecedented virtues and possibilities. But justification implies the sinful, demonic situation which requires justifying. The Spirit is present and glorious, but the Spirit is correlated with and hampered by the "body," remembering that body is the whole order of the concrete. Because the Spirit is mighty and justification is powerful the Christian can live above other men. The power of despair, of necessary repetition of the past, of every "wheel of existence" is finally broken. On the other hand, the Spirit-filled Christian is never justified out of the need for justification. In this world we cannot be perfect, and no possibility is in itself "good" or simply "Christian."

Meanwhile, every man is not a Christian and even the foregoing is beyond the possibilities of the present. Whether a world in which every man is a Christian is a probability is beyond our concern. Just now it is not an actuality. The best that can be looked for is a kind of "united front" in which Christians (themselves mixed) can join together for specific objectives with others (who, if an Irish bull may be permitted, are even more mixed). Anything which is of public concern in any country of the world involves for its realization an incredible mixture of motives and energies.

The view here advanced leaves history with its autonomy, its right to be historical —or, to use the phrase of the day, its right to be existential. History is still real and does not swim in the heavenly haze that sometimes seems to mark the Fourth Gospel. History retains its right to be relative. It is the scene of real but relative fulfillments which gladden the heart but do not satisfy it fully. We are *viatores,* "pilgrims here as were our fathers before us." History is also the scene of real but relative losses, losses that crush the mind and break the heart, and yet which, to quote the Scripture, "do not cast body and soul into hell." Our view leaves history with its right to sin. On the other hand, since love "abides," history may manifest that which is on the final key.

On the other hand, history is always and everywhere of absolute significance because of God's rule over it. It never becomes infinite, never is of itself fulfilling, never becomes God. No event can establish the absolute meaning of history, and consequently no event—not even the destruction of the whole world by a bomb—can threaten that meaning, even a little. For its meaning is in God, who can be trusted to remain Himself. Yet God is the Lord of History, whose rule and concern is with history as we know it. His will is fulfilled in past and future, in the interconnection of times, in relative betterments and losses. The manner of His rule is eternal but the scene of it is this time. Therefore time has a meaning, though it is not free to become its own meaning. Heaven is still heaven and earth is still earth, but to our faith God's Kingdom has come and His will is done, as in heaven, so on earth.

COMMUNIST TYRANNY SPRINGS FROM ITS THEORY

By DON McKEE

When Marxists and ex-Marxists seek to explain the tyranny that has arisen in the Soviet Union, the last place they usually look is at the Marxist theory itself. Most of their explanations assume that the communist doctrine, as laid out by Marx and Lenin, is still valid as the certain path to a free society—and that the authoritarianism that has resulted does not spring from the theory but from its corruption by the present Kremlin autocrats. It is in this vein that Trotsky wrote *The Revolution Betrayed* and recently such well-known authors as Arthur Koestler, Richard Wright, Louis Fischer, and Ignazio Silone contribute to the political anthology, *The God that Failed.* In each case the devil that messed up the "Great Promise" is found to be Stalin and all he represents—not the Marxist doctrine itself.

While of course there is not the slightest possibility of exonerating Stalin for the arbitrary and despotic rule that exists behind the iron curtain, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the tyranny of communism lies at the heart of its political theory—not only in the "betrayal" of its aspirations by the present soviet dictators.

It is in the Marxist theory of power that the tyrannical implications of communism are most apparent. It is here too that Marxism is most contradictory. For starting with the thesis that political power is necessary to bring into being a communist society, Marxism concludes with the insistence that it is totally unnecessary. Beginning with some recognition of the dangers inherent in power, it develops a curious doctrine that political power, at least, is not really dangerous at all. Setting out with the negative or liberal approach towards power, manifest in the insistence that the might of capitalists must be checked by the counter-strength of the proletariat, communism dispenses with the liberal approach once it attains power—and henceforth, until the establishment of the classless society, emphasizes only the positive, unchecked, and absolute employment of power for the ends it holds basic. In much the same way, Marxism—while originally cynical about the employment of power—ends with the most sentimental identification of power and ideals in modern political thought.

Arising out of these contraditions and inconsistencies are a series of principles in Marxism from which the flow of tyranny is inevitable. Some of the most important of these elements may be summarized as:

(1) The theory that political power is not dangerous.
(2) The definition of egoism as greed—never as lust for power.
(3) The theory that forms of economic power other than ownership are not dangerous.
(4) The absolute identification of proletarian power with universalism.
(5) The effects of utopianism on increasing the concentration of communist political power.
(6) The vanguard theory for initiating social change.
(7) The necessity that revolution be insurrection.
(8) The inevitability of repressive dictatorship.

The first five elements in this list derive from the thought of Marx. The last three come principally from Lenin. To these two communist theorists we will now turn.

II

Perhaps the most important element in the political theory of Marx is the denial that political power exists as a separate and independent element in society. For Marx, political power is only a function of society. It is viewed exclusively as an expression of economic and social power, particularly the power that derives from ownership. From this denial of the independent existence of political power spring crucial elements in the Marxist theory that make for tyranny.

(1) Probably the most decisive consequence of this thesis is the denial that political power is dangerous. Since it is derived from society, the source of danger lies elsewhere than in political power itself. For Marx, this source of evil in society is in the economic power that arises from the private ownership of property. It is this which, corrupting the state in capitalism, makes for injustice—never political power as an independent entity. Therefore, when the economic power of private ownership is destroyed, evil is supposed to disappear from social life.

This identification of evil exclusively with the power of ownership means that political power itself is never considered dangerous. Consequently for Marxists, there is nothing to fear from its total concentration in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nor is there any concern for the traditional liberal checks and restraints on this concentration of power, nor any interest in establishing areas of liberty in society free from state power. The startling result of this theory is that communist political power is left total, absolute, and irresponsible in every sense. From this massing of absolute and unchecked power, tyranny inescapably results.

(2) At the foundation of the thesis that the economic power of ownership alone is dangerous lies a peculiar theory in the thought of Marx concerning the nature of social evil itself. For Marx, egoism is always interpreted in terms of greed for economic goods. It is never seen in terms of the lust for power. To define egoism in terms of economic greed alone, however, centers criticism exclusively on men's desires for economic possessions and removes critical judgment from their desires for political power, honor, and glory. At the same time, while focusing attention on preventing undue expansion of individual acquisitions through ownership, it is blind to the dangers to freedom that lie in the desire of rulers to expand and entrench the political power they wield.

Because of course the inordinate expansion of the political power exercised by government officials is always a potent source of despotism, the disastrous effects of such a theory for freedom are obvious. It means total neglect of the vested interests which those who possess communist power develop in their positions. It means the gaze of Marxists is averted from the constant efforts of commissars and planners to expand and entrench their control over others. Finally the absurdity to which this thesis leads is illustrated by the naive Marxist doctrine that the proletarian dictators will eventually have no vested interests in their positions and will give them up voluntarily as soon as private property and social classes are destroyed and it comes time for the state to "wither away."

(3) The dangers to freedom from Marx's identification of social evil exclusively with the power of ownership does not result only in a general blindness to the dangers of political power. It means, too, that Marxism does not consider forms of economic power other than ownership to be essentially dangerous either. Thus management in particular and agencies for integrating and supervising production in general are curiously exempt from restraints in communist lands.

The result of this doctrine is the fantastic thesis that the interests of supervisors and managers are identical with those of the production workers, for the reason that neither of them owns the means of produc-

tion! The origin of conflict in the differences of function and power between men is completely overlooked. Such a theory also leads to the total destruction of all the traditional checks with which collective bargaining, through unions independent of the state, surrounds the arbitrary power of management. As a consequence, workers in communist factories stand almost completely unprotected against the domination imposed upon them by the superior power of management.

(4) A fourth element making for tyranny in Marx's doctrine of economic and political power is his identification of the proletariat in an absolute way with universal values. Because the source of evil is held to lie only in the economic power of ownership, it follows that the working class—which in capitalism is divorced from the means of production and consequently economically disfranchised—has no interests to protect and therefore constitutes a force of disinterestedness in society. Because it does not own the means of production, Marx therefore considers the working class and the power it exercises in history as an uncorrupted and unambiguous force for goodness. Only the proletariat, he holds, is capable of establishing the perfect harmony of classless society and human brotherhood on earth.

At the same time, Marx identifies the bourgeois, in the era of capitalism, in an unqualified way with regression and evil. It is the bourgeoisie who do own the means of production; and therefore they are corrupted by the economic interest that arises from ownership. This upper class is therefore considered a partial, limited, and absolutely tainted force in history—the very negation of the universalism inherent in the working class.

This identification of bourgeois power in an absolute way with evil, and the simultaneous ascribing of universal virtue to the proletariat alone, constitutes one of the greatest dangers to freedom in Marxism. For this equation of the proletariat with the universal and absolute, brands all forces that oppose communism in history as the enemy of righteousness the complete incarnation of evil—and thereby justifies their ruthless destruction. With this doctrine, Marx has furnished the present Soviet dictators with a theoretical justification for beating down every source of criticism and opposition, no matter what its source; for if universalism and righteousness resides exclusively with "proletarian power" in the Kremlin, all opposition to the dictatorship is unqualifiedly evil and worthy only of extermination.

Translated into the international field, this equation of the Soviet Union with universalism leads to a self-righteousness that makes compromising with the West next to impossible. What compromises are made out of deference to the West's power are considered only stepping stones until the moment arrives for extending Soviet domination.

(5) A fifth significant element in the thought of Marx making for tyranny is his utopianism. As soon as private economic power is destroyed, there will supposedly be no more need for political power in society. Not only this, but political power will even "wither away." There will no longer be a state, nor any need for one.

Such a thesis has highly dangerous implications for freedom during the period after the communists seize power in a country. For because political power will eventually wither away, Marxists see no danger in increasing the might of the state during the "transition period" that precedes this final condition of statelessness. The result is the monstrous concentration of all significant power in the state and an unheeded expansion, rather than withering away, of the dictatorship.

III

The tyrannous implications in the Marxist theory were greatly increased by Lenin. While always considering himself a good follower of Marx, the leader of the Russian

revolution made considerable revisions in the communist doctrine of power. Besides introducing several new elements into the theory, he broke openly with Marx on the significant question of how the revolution is to come about, and in addition was highly explicit and definite about many crucial points in the communist doctrine where Marx had been vague and ambiguous. The sum-total of Lenin's contributions to the Marxist theory was to make more sharp all the elements in it which, when translated into action, make for tyranny.

The decisive contributions of Lenin to the communist theory center around three questions: who is to make the revolution, how is the revolution to come about, and what is to be the immediate goal of the revolution? Every one of Lenin's answers to these questions makes for despotism when the theory is put into practice: first, the revolution is to be made by the vanguard of the proletariat, not the working class as a whole; second, it is to come about through insurrection; and third, its inevitable goal is a repressive dictatorship.

(6) Marx held that the proletariat was to make the revolution. Lenin disagreed. The revolution was to be made, not by the entire proletariat, he held, but only its most advanced vanguard—the communist party. There are several elements in this thesis that increase the tyrannical implications of communism.

First of all, Marx held that the proletariat would be educated into a revolutionary class consciousness chiefly by the objective conditions of production as they developed in capitalism. Taught to cooperate in communal production by capitalistic modes of production and made militant by the acute crises and contradictions of the capitalistic system, the working class would eventually reach the stage where they realized their interests did not coincide with capitalism and would consequently replace it with socialism.

For Lenin, however, the objective conditions of capitalism do not and cannot bring about the necessary revolutionary consciousness among the proletariat. Left alone, the workers will only join unions and thereby only reinforce capitalism. In order to get them to break with the bourgeois system, Lenin insisted they must be educated by middle class intellectuals who must "impregnate" the working class with a socialist ideology.

A second deviation from Marx in the vanguard theory concerns the internal organization of the revolutionary party. For Marx the party is to be a mass organization, designed to draw together the workers of the world in a common unity. The internal organization of the party is supposed to be, roughly, democratic.

The exact opposite conception prevails in the writings of Lenin. The party is to consist of a small core of highly-disciplined revolutionary conspirators. Its internal organization is frankly hierarchical, centralistic, and undemocratic.

Still a third deviation from Marx concerns the relationship of the party to the proletariat. For Marx, the more identical the party could become with the proletariat the better. Ideally, there would be no distinction between the two.

In Lenin, however, the party is above and over the working class. The proletariat is the tool and agent of the party. Workers are to dance to the tune the party pipes, not the other way around.

Finally, the identification of the proletariat with universalism in Marx changes in Lenin to the location of universalism in the vanguard itself. It is the vanguard that sees what others do not see. It alone is capable of reading the logic of history. It alone knows the true path to freedom.

The undemocratic aspects of the vanguard thesis are readily apparent. Shifting the task of the revolution from the proletariat itself to an aristocratic elite of the working class is a shift towards oligarchy. It concentrates revolutionary power, which in the thought of Marx was to be widely

dispersed among the entire working class, into the hands of a few professionals. The power of this elite is absolute and dictatorially organized. The vanguard alone is supposed to know what is good for the rest of society; and the unqualified identification of its power with the universal interest provides the party with justification for imposing its will on the backward masses who are incapable of perceiving "the truth." This narrowing of the force of universalism in history to the power of the party, moreover, enlarges the area in society that automatically falls into the classification of being absolutely evil. For now not only the opposition of the bourgeoisie becomes equated with wickedness—but also large elements of the proletariat who are incapable of developing anything but "trade union consciousness"! The repression of communist power therefore does not stop with the bourgeois but must wipe out every manifestation of resistance to the party among the working class iself.

(7) In discussing how the revolution is to come about, Marx was more patient than Lenin. For Marx, the change to socialism had to await the maturing of capitalism. This maturing process would bring into being an industrial proletariat that would constitute the majority of the population, fit them for socialism by training them in communal production processes, grind up the middle class, increase the misery and suffering of the proletariat, cause the unification of production in fewer units, and weaken the capitalistic system with a series of devastating economic crises. Because the working class would eventually become the majority and would be prepared for socialist production by the communal nature of large-scale production under capitalism, Marx held that the change to socialism in America, Britain, and Holland could be accomplished through parliamentary processes without violent insurrection. The use of insurrection for revolution could thus be limited roughly to countries where workers were precluded from participation in parliamentary processes and where a more desperate weapon was needed to defend democratic institutions against counter-revolution.

Lenin, however, was not content to wait for capitalism to mature! He saw that the pre-industrial state was weaker than its counterpart in the later stage of capitalism when imperialism surrounded the state with military and bureaucratic protections. He therefore proclaimed the seizure of power before capitalism had developed!

In doing so, however, Lenin sacrificed freedom. If revolution was to come before capitalism matured, it would have to be made by a proletariat that was still a small minority of the population. The seizure of power for socialism, therefore, could no longer be by democratic processes. In the seizure of power, as Lenin frankly declared, the "minority forces its will upon the majority." Such minority action could be achieved only by violent insurrection. Marx had erred in excluding America and Britain from the violent seizure of power, Lenin asserted, because Marx had not foreseen the protection with which modern imperialism surrounds the state.

But the seizure of power through insurrection, of course, greatly increases the dangers to Liberty. Insurrection, as Lenin himself said, is "the most authoritarian thing in the world." Absolute control over the forces of revolution is required in order to achieve victory, and the resentment and counter-violence that insurrection brings into being require long periods of absolutism to protect the power of the new rulers.

(8) Marx was ambiguous about the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is impossible to say precisely what he meant by it. It is not clear whether he meant the concentration of proletarian power in a parliamentary majority—or something more repressive.

Lenin cleared up the ambiguity. The dictatorship of the proletariat was *not* to be a parliamentary majority. It was a new kind of state and as such an open instrument of repression. The dictatorship of the proletariat would be the dictatorship

of the communist party over all society. This vanguard elite would exercise an "iron discipline" over every aspect of life. Its power would be absolute and monolithic. Opposition to the dictatorship of the party would not be permitted from any source. Unions independent of the communist state, Lenin personally denounced as "a counter-revolutionary trick." The dictatorship would be "based not on law, nor on elections, but on the direct and armed force of this or that section of the population." The implications for tyranny in this kind of absolute, total and irresponsible state are too obvious to require further comment.

IV

Today Lenin's additions to the Marxist theory of power are the accepted doctrine of world communism; and the theories of Marx and Lenin, translated into action, have brought into being one of the most monstrous tyrannies in history. This despotism has come because the theory on which communism is based is faulty. For power is a more ambiguous instrument than the Marxists realize.

The Christian view on the question of power is far more realistic. Fourteen centuries before the communists started writing, St. Augustine stated the problem of power in much more adequate terms than have the Marxists. Power, said Augustine, is *both* necessary *and* dangerous. It is necessary because in the cities of this World men in their selfishness find it difficult to subordinate their personal interests to the common good. Yet every manifestation of power in history is wielded by a partial and contingent force—and thus can never be equated in an absolute way with the City of God.

Since Augustine wrote, history has proven the wisdom of this assertion. For the political power that is necessary to achieve order is also a danger to that order. It always threatens to expand and turn the order it maintains into tyranny. At the same time power that is necessary to achieve freedom in society is also a danger to freedom. For it threatens to turn liberty into anarchy. Thus the problem of all modern democratic societies is to concentrate sufficient power in the state to achieve order and social cohesion—but no more—and to disperse the remaining manifestations of power throughout society, particularly against the state, in order to maintain freedom.

It is the one-sided and inconsistent attitude of communism towards the problem of power that runs it headlong into despotism. For while criticizing all power that is opposed to it as unnecessary and always dangerous, it maintains that its own power is absolutely necessary until the final stage of communism—and never at all dangerous.

What communists lack most is the recognition that all principalities and powers in history stand under a divine judgment. Such a judgment affirms power insofar as it achieves community and justice but condemns it insofar as it fails to do so and produces disorder and tyranny. Such a judgment is a continuous reminder to every holder of power that he is not the center of the universe and that the power he exercises can never be completely equated with the absolute. The failure of communism to recognize this and its constant effort to make a god out of its own power only hastens the adverse judgment it will meet in history.

THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL AND FRENCH EVANGELISM

By JEAN-PIERRE MONSARRAT

The papal Encyclical Letter on Mankind released last August in Rome was aimed mainly at calling the attention of the French hierarchy to certain possible departures of French theologians from the faith. The following notes are intended to give information about a few aspects of the more advanced movements of thought and action in the French Roman Catholic Church (FRCC), how they are aimed at by the Encyclical, and how the Encyclical itself was received by them.

Father Rouquette, writing in *Les Etudes,* October 1950, about the papal letter and the FRCC, remarks that sometimes catholics of other countries seem to believe more or less implicitly that French catholics, in their apostolic zeal, are not concerned to be doctrinally correct. He strongly denies this, yet he readily agrees that the FRCC is on a psychological level, as he calls it, of its own, and this statement he expounds thus:

"The apostolic thought and action of other catholic peoples spring nearly exclusively from their fundamental conviction that the Church is in possession of the Truth. Their main concern is preventing revealed Truth from being lost. We also believe that the Church is in possession of the Truth, and we are ready to give our lives for that fundamental assertion of our faith; but what drives us to thought and action, psychologically speaking, is the anxious realisation of the dechristianised state of the world: this is a sociological phenomenon that is true of countries where Christianity is more strongly established than in France. What we are endeavouring to do is bring back to that Truth the Church holds infallibly those who are ignorant of it. . ." (p. 109).

The first and foremost level on which this is carried out is the evangelisation of the working-class and peasantry. A comprehensive survey of the task done in this field is impossible. I will restrict myself to a few remarks about the evergrowing number of priests who, to meet the working-class on its own ground, have become working men themselves. To the best of my knowledge the initiators of this movement were a group of Paris priests led by the Rev. Depierre, under the protection and the guidance of the late Cardinal Archbishop of Paris Suhard. "Father" Depierre, as he is called in his community, lives in one of the eastern suburbs of Paris, Montreuil, where the official parish priests have no grasp at all on a population communistic in its majority. There he knows everybody and is known of everybody. He has worked in many corporations, he has been a rag-man and a factory worker, and now he is a full-time priest because the community he gathered around him has asked him to be so. Let us see what he himself has to say about his work and purpose in a letter he wrote to *Esprit* (August-September 1946 issue):

"A peasant by birth and a priest of the Catholic Church, I became a workman among the workmen of my neighbourhood, sharing by my destiny and my friendship in the anxiety and enthusiasm, the revolt and the hope of my fellowmen, and I believe I feel in my community the soul still benumbed of the world refashioned in the unity of the Church. Believers or unbelievers, young or old, communists or humanists, we are discovering our unity and our truthfulness with ourselves . . . as we are put to the erection of the same brotherly city, beyond our divisions and easy denials. For we are at the beginning of a renewal of the world, and if we say that the modern world is born without the Church, we are using words abusively: the

modern world is not yet, and it will seek itself until the Face and the Smile of God, through the dynamic and active presence of Christians, through their clear conscience, their unifying penetration, have led it in its yet mishapen and scattered search. The modern world will create itself progressively when the Church, forgetting its limitations of the past, stripped of its clothing from the Middle-Ages, reinvigorated by the evangelical Vision, will have assumed it, transfigured it, unified it. . . The modern world has not found its own soul because in its gestation it has not found the Church" (pp. 322 f.).

Father Depierre bids us remake the Church "to match men and the world". Speaking of those workingclass people among whom he has been living in Montreuil, he says:

"I understood that their hearts, as wide as Mankind, would find our sermons and churches, our exhortations to individual salvation stifling. . . I understood that one could not belong to the Catholic Church if one did not belong to Mankind first, for the Body of Christ is the whole of Mankind quickened by his life. . . . The world and the Church, according to God's eternal design, can only live by one another. . . Those communistic folks have restored to my priesthood the hope and the vision of a cosmopolitan Jerusalem of Pentecost, of a renewed Land, of a salvation at last recovered. My priesthood for the workmen, my religious action, the sacrifice of the mass, took on their real depth as they were extended for me to the spiritual life of those earthly men, spontaneously united for the achievement of the world. They do not know yet that, Son of God, they add 'their efforts to what is lacking in the passion of Christ' (Saint Paul) for the extension of his Kingdom" (pp. 324 f).

And Father Depierre asks:

"Who will communicate the Spirit to the earth and bring to men this revelation: you are the Sons of our God?" (p. 326).

"Christians, we must be born again, otherwise this revolution, salutary to Mankind, will distrust, tomorrow as it does to-day, in its philosophy and in its strategy, a Church whose spiritual forces have been exploited to shelter all selfishness, all slothfulness, all materialisms. Mankind, by its genesis, is revolutionary; Mankind redeemed by Christ is ceaselessly storming original sin and the sin of the world whatever it may be. . . Redemption is a perpetual fight, a perpetual effort of Mankind against the inner evil that strangles it. Then why have those songs of joy and deliverance, started maybe a bit clumsily by the great socialist leaders, met only with condemnation amongst us, contented hearts and closed minds that we are? Why are we not of those that thirst and hunger for justice, open to the Spirit that renews the face of the Earth. . . Why have we, who are living no more the lot of the poor, lost the meaning of the word "Saviour"?. . . Why blame the Marxists for their thirst of an earthly paradise, as if God had not made the earth a Paradise first, as if the Saviour had not torn out the sin of the world, as if we were not saved, redeemed by him. . . ? If we had not thus failed, we would have shared the hope and the anxiety of the new men and as human priests we would have been called upon to enlighten them and unite them, instead of being rejected as aliens and representatives of a spiritual tyranny more terrible than the other one" (pp. 336 f.). "Under all the human tides that run over it, a world is seeking itself, boundless and one like the Universe, infinitely deep like the heart and mind of man. This world cannot find its unity, the knowledge of itself, its end, because it is not quickened by the divine, one, and catholic Church. It has boundless needs, implicit or already analysed by its thinkers, needs that correspond precisely to the mission of the Saviour continued in the Church" (p. 337). In this world the Christian is thus called to a redemptive presence. The fellowship of all those Christians reborn to life "linked to the revolutionary comrades, not yet conscious christians, will be

the new people of Mankind, the Church of the Universe" (p. 340).

These words, significant for the feelings they express and not for their possible theological implications, are representative of a growing trend of thought and life in the FRCC. Under the authority of the assembly of the French cardinals and archbishops, the experiment tried by Father Depierre in Paris has grown to a nation-wide movement reaching town and country. On a national scale this movement is called "La Mission de France." On the local level it is called by the name of the town or country-side: thus "La Mission de Paris." The center of the Mission de France is the Seminary of Lisieux where the priests who want to join it are trained. There have been many contacts between Lisieux and our Lutheran and Reformed Seminary in Paris. They invited four of our students to spend the week of Prayer for the unity of the Church with them. We gladly accepted the invitation and returned it last May. We found men whose sole and deep concern was that of bringing the Gospel back to the French workingclass and peasantry, men who were ready for the fullest collaboration with us in that task. We attended their lectures and worship, they attended ours. One of our students actually preached during an evening mass and one of theirs led our morning prayers according to the Liturgy of the French Reformed Church. They stressed many times that they had no interest in polemics with us, that as far as they were concerned the age of rivalry between catholics and protestants was long past.

How did those priests from Lisieux feel about the Church and its traditional set-up? This is how one of them answered that question when we put it to them: He was studying theology in Rome. He quickly became acquainted with the misery and poverty of the people and he was brought to understand their revolutionary ideas and hopes. He knew, too, the Vatican and all its splendors; every day he could see cardinals in American luxury cars driven by chauffeurs in white gloves. The contrast of the two shocked and scandalised him. His reaction was to join the Mission de France, not in any way to fight against the hierarchy but to bring it to realise what was happening in the world and what the Church's attitude ought to be. Neither the students of the Mission de France nor Father Depierre will say one word of condemnation against what they call the "bourgeois" priests: they are ignorant and blinded and it is their duty to bring them to understand the needs of both world and Church. I remember Father Depierre telling us that he deemed it a great success when the cardinal archbishop of Paris spent a sleepless night brooding over the need of a new apostolic policy in the FRCC after having sat in conference with him.

What is the Father Depierre asking for? First and foremost a change in the training of the priests. Present seminary life is completely secluded and cut off from the world. Men training for the priesthood are cut off from their families, their fellow men, and become completely alien to their political, economic and social concerns. The staff members are holy men but their holiness is irrelevant to the twentieth Century (see the letter of M. Jean Boniface, *Esprit*, August-September 1946, pp. 242 ff.). Father Depierre would like each community to elect to the priesthood one of its own members. Such a scheme cannot work if every priest has to spend twelve years of his life in a seminary before being ordained. Many reforms have already been brought about at Lisieux. The students spend two years of their training in the world. They are sent out with no money and no contacts and have to find work, earn their living and get to know life the hard way. Lisieux is also remarkable for a new curriculum. In a French seminary studies are based on scholastic text books. At Lisieux all the teaching is based on a direct study of the Bible and the early Church Fathers. Among the prescribed books are many protestant works such as Cullman's *Christ and Time* or S. de Dietrich's *Le Dessein de Dieu*. Yet this should in no way be interpreted as significant of a possible departure from the

orthodox Roman faith. What is perhaps most striking in the faith of the Lisieux students is a very strong Roman doctrine of the priesthood. So that on the whole the Mission de France is not directly aimed at in the Papal Encyclical letter on Mankind. The only possible references would be the refusal to reform in any way the teaching in the seminaries in any radical way, though it allows the possibility of "adapting ecclesiastical teaching and methods to modern conditions and requirements through the introduction of some new system."

The Encyclical has far more to say about a group of theologians, many of whom have close personal ties with the Mission de France and who are endeavouring to renew Roman thought and theology. This is how Mgnr. Bruno de Solages, rector of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse, explains why this is a necessary task: "On the whole Christians—even enlightened ones—have not yet realized that Christian thought, at a given time of history, is a synthesis between the divine light that is brought to us through revelation and the data of human reason. Now if divine light is by nature unchangeable, the data of human reason—we are discovering it more and more every day—change with time. The synthesis is bound to change also . . . . As soon as we utter the divine truth, we introduce into that utterance itself a human element. In a way we only possess the divine light in the light it throws on certain human data. We can only separate it from the data it illuminates by substituting other data for them and they will be human too. . . . Christian thought therefore must always be at work. Theology is always to be, and shall always have to be renewed. True theologians are those who perform that task and are not content just with repeating the task of preceding generations. . . . The work required to throw the light of the Gospel on the continually changing reality is huge. 'Vos estis Lux Mundi.' Now there are too many Christians—indeed theologians—who believe the opposite and place unchangeableness in the human elements of Christianity. Their Christian thought remaining therefore that which was relevant to the problems of generations buried long ago, present generations have no interest in it. . . . We must allow the world of thought to be constantly renewed; and it is at the heart of this renewal that the Church must preserve the unchangeable truth of the Gospel of Jesus-Christ and help others to recover the contact with God in it" (*Esprit,* August-September 1946, pp. 221 f.). Most prominent in this task of rethinking Roman Catholic theology for our time are some Paris Dominicans, such as Father Chenu for example, and mainly the Paris and Lyons Jesuits, with men like Father Danielou and Father de Lubac. Father Danielou claims outspokenly that Roman Catholic faith and Thomism are not necessarily linked. I have heard him quote as an instance of this his own incapacity to think out the miracle of the mass along the line of thomistic theology. These theologians are concerned to speak their faith in terms of the contemporary philosophical thought. Thus Father de Lubac's works, *Le Surnaturel, Etudes historiques,* (1946) and *De la Connaissance de Dieu* (1945) are notably at variance with the classical thomistic thought. In the first of these studies he criticises the legalistic elements with which later Thomism has wrapped up the free grace of God. He writes:

"It is not because God, being in himself love and disinterestedness looks upon our service as a blessed participation in his life, that we can make any claim whatsoever in our subjection. Is not the characteristic of the supernatural order that everything that happens in it is beyond the categories of right, interest or commutative justice? These categories . . . have no relevance to the creature face to face with his Creator." In his book on the knowledge of God, de Lubac analyses the problem of faith in God for the modern man and his main emphasis is that the knowledge of God can only come through revelation. He writes: "In principle, the knowledge of God can only be revealed." He makes

a sharp criticism of intellectual and conceptual knowledge. He concludes by stating that all speculation on God, any proof of his existence, must necessarily be, in the Anselmian meaning of the phrase, an intelligence of the faith. I have heard Father Liégé, O. P. chaplain to many colleges in Paris, express similar thoughts. To his mind the traditional proofs of the existence of God are obsolete in our contemporary world.

The more positive side of this trend of thought is a return to the Bible and especially to the early Church Fathers. The general feeling of French Thomists in the face of these new theological trends is that of uneasiness. The concern about it in Spain, and Italy to a certain extent, is far greater still and the papal letter on Mankind voices these concerns. It denounces those who "want to reduce to a minimum the meaning of dogmas and to free dogma itself from the terminology long established in the Church and from philosophical concepts held by Christian teachers. . . . Some audaciously affirm that this must be done because they hold that the mysteries of faith are never expressed by truly adequate concepts but always by proximate and ever changeable notions in which truth is to some extent expressed but is necessarily distorted. Wherefore they do not consider it absurd but altogether necessary that theology should substitute new concepts in place of the old ones in keeping with the various philosophies which in the course of time it uses as its instruments, so that it should give human expressions to divine truths in various ways which are somewhat opposed but still equivalent as they say. . . . It is now doubted whether human reason without revelation and the help of divine grace can by arguments drawn from the created universe prove the existence of a personal God." And the Encyclical recalls: "Truth and its philosophic expression cannot change from day to day, least of all where there is a question of the self-evident principles of the human mind or of those propositions that are supported by the wisdom of the ages and by divine revelation. The Method of Aquinas is singularly preeminent both for teaching students and for bringing truth to light; his doctrine is in harmony with divine revelation and is most effective both for safeguarding the foundation of the faith and reaping usefully and safely the fruits of sound progress."

This is how these statements were interpreted by Father Rouquette, a Paris Jesuit, in *Les Etudes,* October 1950 (pp. 112 f.): "The condemnation of the errors does not involve the pure and simple reprobation of the moderate tendencies of which these excesses are the teratological limits." He claims that no living theologian would hold the positions the Encyclical condemns; none of them goes that far. And he adds: "It is easy to see that explicitly and implicitly under the condemnation of their excesses these moderate tendencies are allowed. . . . The Encyclical reminds us that *Thomism* remains the *official philosophy* of the Church and that it is the system which, if not compulsory, is at least the best adapted to the exact understanding and expression of the dogma. . . . The pontiff does not ask of Catholic philosophers that they should reject all contributions of modern speculation, as if all its research and intuitions were errors in themselves. He simply asks them to be cautious. Finally, it does not seem that one can infer from the Roman document that the teaching authority of the Church intends to close the doors to a *development in Christian philosophy* analogous to the deepening of the revealed data. . . . There is a great apostolic interest in not allowing the belief that all further development of present Thomism is banned. It seems to me that we can continue to seek to go beyond it . . . but on one condition, that we should not deny Thomism or sunder ourselves from it. . . . Let us in any case admit that we are still waiting for something new." Father Liege, in an ecumenical gathering last December, understood the Encyclical in the same way: he maintained very forcefully the distinction between theology and the dogmas. The

dogmas are the object of faith, but not so for theology, and even if Rome wishes theologians to go back to Thomism there can be no final obligation for them to do so. Thomas Aquinas is the best of Roman Catholic theologians but not the only one; other theologies are possible.

The papal letter on Mankind has also a few words to say about the relationship of science to theology, and about the evolutionist theology. The theologian the present writer has in mind in this section is Father Teilhard de Chardin. This is how he himself has explained his position (*Esprit,* August-September 1946, pp. 254 ff): "Up to now Roman Catholics have kept a purely defensive attitude towards the new scientific Gospel. They simply wanted to show that their position was tenable notwithstanding the new discoveries. Their strategy was limited to saying that Evolution, at the worst, was a plausible hypothesis, but always a very weak one. Why this shyness? By force the Christian dogma has to adapt itself to a static universe. . . . But what would happen if one tried along with certain of the old Greek Fathers to transpose the revealed datum in a universe of a dynamic type? This is what a certain number, constantly growing, of Catholic thinkers have asked themselves to-day. And we have not had to wait long for the answer. Not only does experience prove that the traditional christology is compatible with a world in evolution; but, contrary to all previsions, it is in the midst of this new and unitarian environment, by means of that particular bend of space linked to time, that it can develop itself the most freely and abundantly." The great cosmic attributes of Christ bestow on him a universal and final primacy over creation. It is only in the setting of an evolution that their real meaning comes out, provided of course that that evolution is of a spiritual and convergent type. "Under this provision, nothing is more easy and nothing more tempting than seeking in the revealed christogenesis a final explanation of and crowning of the cosmogenesis of the scientists. Christianity and Evolution: not two irreconcilable visions of the world, but two vistas to fit in and complete one another." To this statement the papal letter replies: "For there are many scientists who, though the evolutionary system has not been finally proved in the field of the natural disciplines, admit it without caution or discernment and pretend that it concerns the origin of all things, thus favoring fearlessly the monistic and pantheistic hypothesis of a universe under perpetual evolution." This of course goes far beyond the actual thought of Father Teilhard de Chardin who strenuously maintains the transcendence of Christ at the center of his system.

In an overall picture we have on the one hand the tremendous evangelistic concern and the new developments in theology and Roman thought in general it is leading to. On the other hand the Vatican, while refraining from crushing it, is seeking to keep a firm hand on it and to maintain the preeminence of Thomism. The outcome of it all we can but wait for. Yet we would stress that obedience to Rome is a primary concern in all French theologians. We will quote once more Father Rouquette: "In the daring of his search the Catholic thinker, if he wants to be faithful to the Church, keeps a deep attitude which alone authenticates his daring and makes it legitimate: *an attitude of disposableness* (disponiblité). That is to say that he is ready to be silent if the Church thinks his silence is necessary to the universal good of Christendom. He is ready as a son to give his full obedience when the teaching authority of the Church requires it. The Catholic thinker knows that his individual thought is not indispensable to the life and thought of the Church. He knows too that his individual thought is fallible and he believes in any case that the Holy Spirit will make truth victorious. This truth will not manifest itself without the thinkers suffering even in their intelligence in seeking its advent. The sacrifice of obedience and research are both as useful to the task of truth, of the Holy Spirit" (*Les Etudes,* October 1950, p. 116).

BOOK REVIEWS

A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR. *By Frank Tannenbaum.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. 199 pp.

Professor Tannenbaum has written an important work with many significant insights, which do not, however, add up to a valid philosophy of the labor movement.

His main thesis seems to be that unionism emerges and functions as a spontaneous effort on the part of the worker to re-establish a community for himself amidst the disorganization and *anomie* of modern industrial society. "The union is the spontaneous grouping of individual workers thrown together functionally. It reflects the moral identity and psychological unity men always discover when working together, because they need it and could not survive without it" (p. 75). Through his union, the worker becomes "a man once again, not just a cog in the machine;" he "regains his dignity as a man and once again plays the part of a moral person" (pp. 78, 100). Trade unionism, in short, is the modern worker's "community."

But trade unionism, according to Mr. Tannenbaum, is much more than that; it is a force remaking society in a way not quite envisaged by anyone. "Without intent or plan, the trade union movement is integrating the workers into what in effect amounts to a series of separate social orders. It is recreating a society based on status and destroying the one we have known in our time —a society based on contract" (p. 140). In this way, it is really a "conservative" or even "counter-revolutionary" movement, virtually undoing the disintegrative work of the bourgeois revolution. The new society that unionism is building—"syndicalist" would well describe it, although Mr. Tannenbaum does not use the term—is held to be the only real alternative to statism, whether in its Soviet-totalitarian or British-"democratic" form (in the end, very much the same). Such, according to Mr. Tannenbaum, is the ultimate significance of labor unionism in modern society.

Obviously, there is much that is true in this "philosophy." But obviously too, it is subject to severe criticism and qualification, without which it could lead to a grave misunderstanding of the labor movement in modern society. It is true that through his union, the American worker enjoys a corporate status in society, and perhaps even a sense of vocation, that he could never possess by virtue of his individual position. But it is simply not true, as Mr. Tannenbaum contends, that the trade union, in contemporary America, is the worker's "society," the social group in which and through which he is able to "play the part of a moral person" (p. 100). Quite obviously, the American worker achieves his status in society in a variety of social contexts, of which his trade union is but one, though no doubt a very important one. Mr. Tannenbaum seems to be thinking in terms of early capitalism in Britain and the condition of certain groups of immigrant workers in this country. It is certainly misleading to think of the contemporary American worker in such terms.

Mr. Tannenbaum, moreover, tends to overlook what I should take to be the most important fact about trade unionism—its emergence and functioning as a *power institution* limiting the arbitrary power of management and establishing a constitutional as opposed to a despotic regime in industry. His sociological categories do not seem to be of much use in dealing with the power dimension of trade unionism, thereby betraying their incapacity really to get to the heart of the matter.

But perhaps most serious is Mr. Tannenbaum's pronounced tendency to conceive of labor unionism in totalistic terms. "A society," he asserts, "tends to become all-embracing and a way of life" (p. 69). Being the worker's "society," unionism may there-

fore quite properly—indeed, must inevitably—claim total jurisdiction over the total life of the worker. "The trade union represents all the life-interests of its members" (p. 168). This is false both in fact and in principle. The trade union is not *the* "society" of the American worker by any means; in our culture, it is only one among many. And were the labor movement indeed to claim, as Mr. Tannenbaum claims for it, total jurisdiction over "all the life-interests of its members," this claim would obviously constitute a totalitarian pretension as incompatible with a democratic labor movement as with democracy itself. Mr. Tannenbaum, in effect, makes an idolatrous absolute out of the labor movement and grants it exclusive control of life. Not many labor leaders who have learned their lesson from the experience of recent decades will thank him for this attempt. If it is not to become self-destructive, the claim of the labor movement over its members can only be a partial claim, limited and circumscribed, first by the claims of other social institutions and loyalties, and ultimately by the claim of a majesty that transcends all earthly majesties. Because Mr. Tannenbaum, despite all his insights, cannot understand this, his "philosophy" brings no real understanding of the place or the future of trade unionism in democratic society.

WILL HERBERG

COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CATHOLIC POWER. *By Paul Blanshard.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. 340 pp. $3.50.

This volume is a sequel to the author's well-known, best-selling *American Freedom and Catholic Power.* Where the earlier book dealt in detail with aspects of Roman Catholic teaching and practice which the author believes conflict with the ideals and practices of American democracy, the present volume undertakes to describe what is called 'the deadly parallel' between Roman Catholicism and Communism, between the Vatican and the Kremlin.

Blanshard has an easy mark in pointing out such parallels, and he is an excellent marksman. The structure of power surrounding the Kremlin and Vatican, while utterly different in some respects, is similar in others. The 'devices of deification' by which Pope and Stalin are surrounded with ceremony and symbol, and thus raised to divine stutus, show similarity. Both Kremlin and Vatican find the free public school an object of offense. The systems of training for Roman priesthood and Communist party membership employ similar devices of disciplining and directing the mind and will. Both powers undertake what Blanshard calls 'the management of truth', i.e., the distortion of truth for propaganda purposes. Both alike carry on a 'strategy of penetration', i.e., they bore from within free governments, churches, and societies. Thus two organizations which to superficial observation seem poles apart are shown to possess great similarity of aim and method and attitude.

Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power illustrates the careful study and detailed documentation we have come to expect from its author. It also includes in the appendix excerpts from the Mussolini-Vatican agreement of 1929, and the Roosevelt-Spellman correspondence of last year. Blanshard does his homework carefully and thoroughly. For all his care, it is still a thorny question how selective he has been. Granted the care in study and documentation, as well as the accuracy of his factual statements, one may still raise the question of how adequate the description is for all of Catholicism. But at the very least, what Blanshard gives us is a carefully documented study of one aspect of Catholicism which is of urgent significance today.

A further and similar question turns upon the author's own frame of reference. Reviewers of Blanshard's previous book spoke of its 'undiluted secularism.' Catholic writers have made similar charges against the present book. In this reader's opinion, such attitudes, while clearly present, are

quite secondary to the careful marshalling of ponderable facts. His opinions of some aspects of Catholicism, e.g., certain monastic orders such as the Trappists, is, to say the least, unsympathetic. His conception of democracy has overtones of American nationalism which are disquieting. Nevertheless every believer in a free church in a free state will welcome this book. True, we will want to disagree with some of Blanshard's opinions and interpretations; for free men that is always possible. But we must be profoundly grateful for the way in which he points out the totalitarian shadow which lies across the path of democracy today.

Catholic reactions to this book raise the question of just when a book or a man is anti-catholic. Is it possible to disagree in any fundamental way with Catholicism without drawing upon oneself the charge of intolerance, and bigotry? For the Catholic this appears impossible. Therefore as Protestants we must go our way, seeing in Catholicism elements of Christian truth, but also serious distortions of truth. As believers in democracy we can hardly avoid seeing a desperately serious and urgent problem in the material Blanshard presents.

JOHN HUTCHISON

MAN AND STATE. *By Eivind Berggrav.* Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1951. $4.00.

The author of this volume is best known as the Primate of the Lutheran Church of Norway, whose career reached heroic proportions during the Norwegian fight against the Nazi overlords. He has just retired from his position as Bishop of Oslo.

The significance of this volume is a double one. On the one hand it contains some of the historic addresses of 1941–45 in which he extricated the Lutheran thought of Norway from a too slavish adherence to the Pauline and Lutheran admonition of obedience to the "powers" which are "ordained of God" (Romans 13). Bishop Berggrav's modification of this Pauline passage, which has had such a fateful influence upon Lutheran political theory, lies in his insistence that the power which is ordained of God is the "power of law" and does not include lawless power which happens to have succeeded in establishing dominion. His thought upon this subject is not very different from that of the Calvinists of the 16th and 17th century, who brought Calvinism in a more fruitful alliance with democratic thought than Lutheranism achieved until its fight with Nazism, by similar reservations in regard to Romans 13.

But there is more to this volume than this weighty contribution. The bulk of the volume deals with the basic issue of preserving the essential freedoms of a Christian-humanistic culture against the tendencies toward totalitarianism which are implicit in a technical civilization. In dealing with this issue we find Bishop Berggrav making the most careful and discriminate judgments on the relation of political to economic power; on the comparative significance of work and leisure for the meaning of human existence; on the problem of inflexible standards as against the necessity of pragmatic policies for particular occasions, etc. There is not a single modern problem of social and economic policy which is not illumined by the Bishop's treatise. It has long been a favored indictment of Lutheran thought in the realm of politics that it is incapable of discriminate judgements. We have frequently been told that this defect inheres in German, rather than in Lutheran thought *per se;* and that the Scandinavian Lutherans have always been superior to the Germans in their political discriminations. This book would seem to be a proof of such a thesis. It is at any rate an impressive and illuminating treatise on Christian political ethics.

R. N.

RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND THE POLITICS OF POWER. *By Vernon H. Holloway.* New York: The Church Peace Union, 1951. 72 pp.

In this very useful little book, Dr. Holloway briefly but with clarity and competence discusses the proper function of religious faith and ethics in the international political arena. The Judaic-Christian tradition, which combines a sober view of man with the conviction that God is sovereign over all of life, provides a particular sort of motivation, perspective, and discipline for political action, but it spins no political or economic programs out of itself. Hence "the man who is keenly aware of the divine requirement that he deal justly and compassionately with all men has to wrestle not only with the egoism and isolationism of his own heart but with the practical difficulties in the way of finding a program that will work in an imperfect world in which no program can succeed on the strength of pure love, but in which at the same time no program is justified without a measure of goodwill" (p. 15). Such a religious realist, if he is to follow the insights of his faith as he deals with international problems, must therefore become also a political realist, with a sound understanding of power politics and of the practical possibilities that inhere within the framework of international relations as they presently exist. However, American religionists during the past years as they have faced the problem of world order have been divided into two main groups. The realists have stressed the necessity of calculations of power, the need of taking military risk, and an awareness of the serious nature of Soviet imperialism; the idealists have inclined to the condemnation of any resort to the politics of power in the quest of peace and have tended to overemphasize one set of values, thereby evading, ignoring, or discounting other values which are also at stake in political action. Dr. Holloway insists that the latter way is inadequate, for lofty intention applied with ignorance may lead to disaster, and it is futile to preach a perfectionist ethic for international policies which cannot regulate even a domestic society.

From his vantage-point as a religious and political realist, Professor Holloway penetratingly analyzes the present international picture, setting his discussion of the United Nations in historical perspective. His estimate of the United Nations is sobering, but despite its many limitations and weaknesses it has contributed valuable but qualified services to the cause of peace and deserves the serious support of religiously-motivated individuals and of religious bodies. Religious leadership can make a positive contribution to the solution of the present predicament by stressing the historic mission of our nation, a mission in the service of a reality far above ourselves and our nation that judges both us and our enemies with a judgment that must not be ignored. Religious bodies can render invaluable service by continually calling attention to the universal rule of justice, by pointing out the sin of racial pride, by bringing judgment on the idolatries of those who worship "capitalism," and by stressing the human needs of the impoverished.

This is a stimulating, lucid, provocative account. In such a brief treatment, some oversimplifications are inevitable; discussion of the attitudes of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups without some further analysis of their fundamental differences is regrettable. It is to be hoped that the author will later develop more fully his concept of the historic mission of America with special reference to the many perversions of that idea. But as a particularly usable introduction the book is most valuable, and deserves wide study. Its usefulness is increased by the discussion questions and annotated bibliographies that follow each chapter.

ROBERT T. HANDY

CHRISTIANITY AND REASON. *Edward D. Myers, editor.* New York: Oxford U. Press, 1951. xiii and 172 pp., $3.00.

This symposium is composed of essays which, with the exception of the first and

the last, were given several years ago at the annual meeting of the Guild of Scholars in the Episcopal Church. The calibre of the contributors (Theodore M. Greene, Lewis M. Hammond, Helmut Kuhn, Howard D. Roelofs, George Thomas, Wilbur Marshall Urban, and John Wild) is an indication that this is a volume of considerable importance.

Although there is no one underlying theological viewpoint in these essays, which contain, in fact, significant differences of opinion, there is a major as well as a minor *motif* which can be said to inform all of the contributions. The major *motif* is that in any assessment of the Christian faith, any attempt to communicate it, any attempt to understand it, the faculty of the human reason must be allowed to play a very high and very important role. The minor *motif*, explicit in several of the essays, implicit in several of the others, is that the theology of Karl Barth is a distinct disservice in the achievement of this end. There is, indeed, generous acknowledgement of the values Barth has rendered our age, as, for example, in George Thomas' essay (p. 49), but when all is said and done it is felt that Barth's position with regard to reason and its place in theology is intolerable. This is especially true in the concluding essay by Helmut Kuhn, which contains a sustained attack on Barth (esp. pp. 148–158).

It may just possibly be the case, however, with regard to this minor *motif*, that in this particular matter Barth's major sin is not that he has written so "one-sidedly" on this topic, but that he has written so abundantly on every topic, and has thereby provided his opponents with plenty of material which may be used against him. This reviewer finds it hard to see, for example, how the writers of the present symposium could disagree with the statement in Barth's latest book, where he says quite explicitly,

"Christendom and the theological world were always ill-advised in thinking it their duty for some reason or other, either of enthusiasm or of theological conception, to betake themselves to the camp of an opposition to reason. . . In the word of Christian proclamation we are always concerned with *ratio*, reason, in which human *ratio* may also be reflected and reproduced. . . Christian faith is not irrational, not anti-rational, not supra-rational, but rational in the proper sense" (*Dogmatics in Outline*, pp. 22–3).

No doubt this can be shown to be inconsistent with other statements by Barth, notably in his Gifford Lectures, but it can at least serve to indicate that the "villain" is not so completely beyond the possibility of "redemption" as is often assumed.

Having aired this point, it must be said, in returning to the major *motif*, that the authors have done a clear job of presenting what seems to them a reasonable, consistent and workable view of the relationship between faith and reason. Of particular help is the essay by George Thomas on "Theology and Philosophy", which is, as its subtitle accurately designates, "a mediating view." He raises critical questions about the adequacy of the interpretations of Barth and Brunner, and finds more help in the type of approach made by H. H. Farmer and William Temple. There is a clear statement of his own constructive position on p. 48.

Thomas also rejects St. Thomas, and it it interesting in the light of his comments, to read the preceding essay by John Wild, which, although Wild would disavow the tag, seems quite clearly to be a re-statement of the "Thomist" position. His discussion, particularly from p. 30 on, follows the familiar distinctions of Aquinas, and serves notice to Americans that just as Aquinas has an Anglican champion in Britain in the person of E. L. Mascall, so in America his position can be persuasively restated by John Wild. The same general orientation of viewpoint is discovered in Lewis Hammond's essay, which leans heavily on Aquinas, Maritain and Gilson, and contains a helpful discussion of analogy.

The concluding essay, by Helmut Kuhn, to which reference has already been made, is a noble plea to contemporary Christians to take the "risk" of once again trying to incorporate the wisdom of the Greeks into Christian thought.

This book, then, is characteristic of the best of Anglican thought in trying to mediate between extreme positions. This reviewer looks wistfully, however, for a bit of the tang of Reformation thought, and wishes that it could have been represented at first hand within the covers of the volume. It would be an interesting experience to get the authors of this symposium together in debate with the authors of a book like *Reformation Old and New* (ed. Camfield, Lutterworth Press), which demonstrates the relevance and importance of Barth's thought upon the British theological landscape, and see what type of creative viewpoint might emerge.

ROBERT McAFEE BROWN



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Robert McAfee Brown has been instructor in Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Seminary this past year, and in September he will take up new duties as head of the Department of Religion at Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Will Herberg, well known to the readers of this journal, is devoting most of his time to free-lance writing and lecturing. He is on the editorial board of *Commentary,* and he will be the editor of a newly-founded Jewish theological magazine.

Robert T. Handy is Assistant Professor of Church History at Union Theological Seminary, New York.

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